After decades of subjugation by the Syrian regime, demographic shifts, immigration, narrow self interest, not to mention a sliver of paranoia, Lebanon’s Christians face an existential challenge to rebuild and restructure their political institutions, restore their once-commanding role on the Lebanese political scene and reinforce Lebanon as a pluralistic, sovereign and democratic country. The wilderness years have contributed both to the Michel Aoun phenomenon and the shaky office of the president of the republic.

A weakening

Of the factors that contributed to the weakening of the Christian political institutions, the biggest is arguably demographics. The Christian population has shrunk, primarily due to a double-whammy of declining births and an increase in emigration. Elsewhere in Lebanon, the Muslim population has grown, especially in the Shia community, while a better spread of schools across the land and easier access to the cities has lead to the creation of a qualified, competent and wealthier generation from the rest of Lebanon’s sectarian spectrum. The sectarian playing field has leveled, but the Christians have failed to respond.

According to Waddah Sharara, a sociology professor at the Lebanese University and a columnist at the pan-Arab daily al-Hayat, the Christian political institutions were wounded by regional events, first by the 1967 Six-Day War only to be then further injured by the Camp David accords and Iranian Revolution, both in 1979.  “These regional issues gave the Lebanese parties, linked to regional powers, elements of strength and pressure,” he told NOW Lebanon.

Domestically, Sharara added, regional aftershocks were not helped by a narrowing of how Christians viewed their role in Lebanon’s power sharing. “The main [problem] was that there was never a Christian consensus on the relation of Christian sects to the state,” he said, adding that there exists what he calls a “revisionist” tradition among Christian leaders who have always resorted to resurrecting what they see as the Christians’ primary interests, that touch on the Christians’ continuity and survival in a predominantly Muslim Middle East: Emile Eddé was a revisionist for Bechara al-Khoury. The Kataeb are also revisionists for Bechara al-Khoury. Bachir Gemayel was a revisionist for his father, Pierre Gemayel, while Samir Geagea is a revisionist for Amin Gemayel. 

According to revisionists, the function of the office of the presidency of the republic is for Christians, and its primary function is to protect their interests in the face of the Lebanese Muslims and the rest of the Arabs, who, they believed, rejected any notion of a Christian Lebanon and who also want a say in the election of the president. Therein, said Sharara, lies the problem.

“The concept of revisionists is based on the idea that the presidency is the Christians’, namely the Maronites’, share. It is seen as the Maronites’ representation within the state, rather than a role in which they deal with the state as a shared and mixed entity,” Sharara explained.

The Syrian factor

This skewed vision allowed Syria, during its 29 year occupation, to marginalize the Christians, their leadership and their political institutions, while the fortunes of other sects, such as those of the Shia, rose. It was a condition that led to what today is nothing short of paranoia and insecurity.

It is easy to see why. The 1992, 1996 and 2000 electoral laws were tailored by the Syrians to weaken the Christians and strengthen other sects. Christian leaders with genuine popular support were either excluded from government, in exile or in jail. Those who held positions of power had sold out to Damascus. The 1994 naturalization laws that saw the population increase by 10 % (80 % of which were Syrian Muslims) didn’t help matters.

The Aoun challenge

Nor, on reflection, did the return of former army commander and now MP Michel Aoun in 2005.  The discord and division he has sown has been a victory for the Syrian-Iranian axis, both of whom see a divided Christian street as a critical ingredient for their regional horse-trading and their ambitions for Lebanon should the March 8 bloc prevail in Lebanon’s 2009 parliamentary elections.

What is more worrying is how all this has impacted the presidency. While the Christian political establishment has not been able to elect a consensus president since the mid-1970s, Sharara believes Aoun’s understanding of the presidency, in which he appears to negate Lebanon’s proud pluralistic tradition, is warped. By demanding that the Christians bring their “representative” to presidency, as other sects do with their posts, he is forgetting that the presidency is for all Lebanese.

“By suggesting that the presidency is for Christians, he is ignoring the fact that presidency is the constitutional key of the system, and that [while] the Shia brought [Amal head Nabih] Berri as the [parliament] Speaker because of Syrian calculations, [Berri’s] powers have been destructive to the office, especially in the last three years,” said Sharara. “Aoun, by demanding a similar practice, threatens to wreak more destruction on the constitutional system.” Sharara explained that Aoun is asking for exactly what Syria wants, namely no political competition within the sects. Instead, he believes, Aoun and others in his camp should encourage other sects to throw off the notion of self in favor of the greater national good. “In Lebanon, political life works better when there is more than one political party in each sect.”

Aoun allows Syria to keep the country and the sects divided. “The Syrians wanted someone who would divide the Christians. They are still not totally happy with Sleiman. They consider him a necessary solution [after Doha], and his assassination is still a possibility. Otherwise, they expect him to become an impotent leader like former President Elias Sarkis. They are still sending him messages, such as Aoun’s visit to Tehran when he was in Saudi Arabia, not to mention the rejection of a defense strategy and the recent security embarrassments,” Sharara added.

Michel Sleiman was tested before his “election.” Two top key army officers – Brigadier François Hajj and Captain Wissam Eid – were murdered, and then there was the battle for Nahr al-Bared and the attempted coup of May 7. “The Syrians would prefer someone like Aoun or Franjieh because they can foster the Christians divisions,” said Sharara.

Aoun has proved since he returned to Lebanon that his political practices have only weakened state institutions. For the first time, a Christian leader with sizeable popularity has worked against the logic that Christians fought to preserve and has pitted his followers against the West, the Christians’ historical ally.

The Christians must play it smart. Instead of using any gains to secure their own power, they can ensure that the state institutions over which they hold sway, starting from the presidency, are for all Lebanese.