REPORT AND
ANALYSIS CONCERNING THE TRIAL AND VERDICT OF SAMIR GEAGEA AND
THE CO-ACCUSEDIN THE CASE OF THE BOMBING OF THE CHURCH OF
SAYYIDAT AL NAJJAT ZOUK MIKAYELNo.3 of 1994
Table of
Content
1.0
INTRODUCTION
2.0
CHARGES - INDICTMENT
3.0
POLITICAL AGENDA
4.0
GIRGES EL KHOURY
5.0
ACCUSED IN ABSENTIA
6.0
SAMIR GEAGEA
1.0
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose of Paper;
This Paper is compiled as a response and was deemed necessary by
the writer who acts on behalf of Dr. Geagea for the purpose of
highlighting what are believed to be breaches of human rights
provisions as they apply per force of international instruments
acknowledged by the Republic of Lebanon and for which it has no
reciprocal observance, either in its domestic laws, or alternately
has failed to implement and accord the provision of those human
rights provisions to Dr. Geagea and his co-accused in the trial of
the bombing of the Church of Sayyidat Al Najjat (hereafter the
Church).
1.2 The position that the
writer sees in presenting this paper is not one of commenting
specifically on the intricacies of the Lebanese domestic
provisions concerning the Criminal Law and its procedure, but
rather to highlight the fact that in the performance of the
provision of a trial to the accused it was less than a fair trail
and in fact constituted a gross abuse of human rights, resulting
in a trial which was unfair and a verdict which was unsafe and
unsatisfactory.
1.3 The manner and method of
the analysis of the verdict is to examine the procedure, the
evidence, the findings and or inferences derived therefrom and
ultimately the verdict arrived at and assess whether it conformed
to the precepts laid down by the international Covenants to which
Lebanon is a signatory.
1.4 In addition to acting for
Dr. Geagea, the writer has also had the carriage and control of
the presentation of representations on behalf of Jean Youssef
Chahine, Antonios Obeid and also a familiarity with the defence of
Mr. Rushdi Raad as well as acting for Mr. Rafik Al Fahel who was
the subject of an extradition request from Sweden to Lebanon which
was rejected shortly after the intervention of the writer acting
in conjunction with his Swedish lawyers.
1.5 The verdict is a document
which is annexed to this submission so that ease of reference may
be made to observe and follow the argument in the analysis
presented. It is obvious we submit that when one reads the verdict
it is capable of being followed as a document deliberative of the
material presented and of the conclusions reached from that
material applying the law as it purports to do in the
circumstances. The legal norms that pertain to an inquisitorial as
opposed to an adversarial system are not such that they would
render an appreciation of the verdict any less capable of being
viewed for the deficiencies that appear therein. In short, the
writer is satisfied that in the circumstances regardless of the
manner in which the trial proceeded as to inquisitorial or
adversarial, there was a gross breach of human rights accorded to
each of the accused both those present and in particular those in
absentia. The accused in absentia and hereafter to mean the
following people unless the context otherwise requires are
Antonios Obeid, Rushdi Raad, Jean Chahine, Paul Al Fahel and Rafik
Al Fahel.
1.6 The significance of the
analysis of the verdict in the manner that it is presented is to
highlight the fact that the trial failed to accord the basic
minimum in terms of the conditions that have been laid down by the
various international instruments and in particular the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as they apply to the domestic forum
and the laws that implement the procedures in such forums.
1.7 There is no doubt in the
writer's opinion that the impetus given to this trial for
international condemnation was in no small part brought about by
the very pertinent and prompt response by Amnesty International
which was critical of the trial of Dr. Geagea, resulting in the
conviction for the murder of Mr. Danny Chamoun and his family on
24 June 1995: Amnesty International Index MDE 24 June 1995,
Lebanon, "Lebanese Forces Trial Serious Flawed"; see also US
Department of State Report on Human Rights practices for 1995 -
Lebanon and Amnesty International Report 1995 at p192.
1.8 The method
in analysing the verdict as appears herein will be to initially
consider the method and the approach of the Judicial Council of
Lebanon, (hereafter the Court) and to assess the various
procedures that were embarked upon in the deliberation of the
Court. Further, there will be an analysis of the material
presented as evidence by those accused who were present for the
trial and in particular Mr. Malek, Mr. El Khoury and Dr. Geagea.
In addition thereto we will also attempt to highlight the gross
miscarriage of justice accorded to the accused in absentia and in
particular Mr. Obeid, Mr. Chahine and Mr. Raad who all presented
affidavit material, duly notarised, and which was summarily
rejected out of hand by the Court when the same showed that the
accused could not have possibly been involved in the planning,
preparation and ultimate commission of the crime as they were all
absent from the territory of Lebanon.
2.0
CHARGES - INDICTMENT
2.1 The trial in
respect of the case of the bombing of the Church was conducted by
the Court commencing in or about November 1994 and concluding on
13 July 1996. The trial was held on a week-end or certainly on a
part time basis being convened on a Friday and for half of
Saturday. Such a feature is of itself unusual in that a trial of
such a major crime where capital punishment is invariably a
possible penalty and in all probability would be called for,
should be conducted in such a manner is rather remarkable. The
ability to concentrate, analyse and present evidence and conduct
cross-examination in a coherent and co-ordinate fashion is
difficult at the best of times in a trial that runs on a Monday -
Friday format with a regularity as to hours and a duration which
is to say the least permanent from the start Until the conclusion
of the matter. To so hold this trial which was indicted as a crime
against the State and an attempt to inflame sectarian violence
within Lebanon, after it had just come through a very sad and
sordid period of Civil War is bizarre. The trial running from
November 1994 until July 1996 was not only marred by the
intermittent hearing given to it, but also was featured with
lengthy periods of adjournment for no explicable reason and at
times the refusal by the Attorneys representing the accused to
continue whilst they perceived the treatment of the prisoners by
the Court to be less than satisfactory. The detention in a
military prison being an example of the complaints registered by
defence counsel.
2.2 Initially the observation
that has to be made is that the trial by virtue of its
intermittent hearings was unsatisfactory with respect to the
conduct and presented a prejudice and a disadvantage to the
accused and their lawyers to be able to participate in the process
by following the evidence, challenging and testing it where
necessary and presenting their own cases. Coupled with this are
the materials and the findings that I made in my earlier report on
the conduct of the trial of both this matter and the trial of Dr.
Geagea for the murder of Mr. Danny Chamoun and his family of which
Dr. Geagea was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment.
This trial was running in tandem with the trial the subject of
this paper and that also in itself constituted a gross abuse by
having to meet two cases of a capital nature, together with sundry
offences associated therewith, such as possession of firearms and
weapons and/or breaches of public order. The joinder of several
matters on one indictment may well be justifiable in respect of
the particular crime at hand, but where there is a trial of two
major matters and the indictments for both matters are tried
jointly, it represents a very difficult task for any trial lawyer.
In particular in this matter, that is to say the trial in question
and the case concerning the Chamoun Family, both trials were
conducted simultaneously but on alternate week-ends from the
Friday extending to the Saturday by different prosecutors, whereas
the defence teams were invariably the same for reasons of economy
and logistics of presenting and meeting the material.
2.3 At the outset it must be said that the accused who were
present are referred to in the verdict as are the accused who were
absent. Those accused who were absent were as regards Mr. Obeid
and Mr. Chahine, situated in Australia, the former being an
Australian citizen, while the later is a person seeking refugee
status. As regards Mr. Raad, he is a citizen of Canada and the A1
Fahel brothers are residents of Sweden and in the case of Mr.
Rafik A1 Fahel, he has been granted asylum and consequently
citizenship. It is my understanding that his citizenship came
swiftly on the refusal of the request for extradition by the
Lebanese authorities.
2.4 No formal request was
made to my knowledge to extradite either Mr. Obeid or Mr. Chahine
from Australia and I know of no formal extradition being applied
for or for that matter entertained by the Canadian Government in
respect of Mr. Raad.
2.5 The prosecution of the
accused in respect of the case of the Church, was as a result of a
decree setting up the investigation No. 4835 and dated 2 March
1994~which referred the matter to the Court. The case's
significance is not in anyway undermined by the fact that it
highlighted apart from the murder of the individual worshipers and
desecration of the Church, it was referred to as an assault on the
States internal security and public safety and sought to bring to
justice all of the perpetrators who either participated,
instigated or interfered in the bombing in any capacity. Not
unnaturally the accessorial liability of all who were responsible
in anyway shape or form was cast as wide as possible in terms of
the drag net that looked for suspects.
2.6 The judicial investigator
who was appointed to review the material was Judge Joseph Freiha.
His deliberations and investigations resulted in an indictment,
which was dated 13 June 1994 and constituted the basis for the
presentation of the case before the Court. The indictment
statement that also emanated from the office of the prosecutor was
issued on 16 June 1996 which is referred to in the Courts
judgment.
2.7 The indictments as
presented charged and sought to portray Dr. Geagea as the
principal, accountable for the perpetration of the crime of the
bombing of the Church as its planner, the one who ordered the
execution thereof and was a participant in concealing the
perpetrators who acted under his orders and enabled them to flee
from justice. The motive for the bombing was expressed to be an
attempt to bring about an alteration to the Constitution of the
country for which charges were laid pursuant to articles 30,
308-315 of Punitive Act as well as article 549 and 549 - 201 of
Act 11.1.1958. In addition the accused Obeid, Raad, Chahine and E1
Khoury, were each charged pursuant to those provisions excepting
article 30 of the Punitive Act. With respect to Mr. Malek, he was
charged with Dr. Geagea as participating in the agenda and further
that he acquired military weapons taking part in concealing the
same ensuring there distribution thereby breaching articles 301
and 308-315 together with article 219 of the Punitive Act as well
as Act 11.1.1958.
2.8 As to the complicity of
the A1 Fahel brothers, they also were charged with respect to
offences pursuant to articles 301 and 308-315 together with
article 219 of the Punitive Act and Act 11.1.1958. In addition
each of the accused who are referred to above were all charged
pursuant to article 72 of the Weapons Act. The accused were
indicted on 16 June 1994 after a period of arrest, interrogation
and detention which I am informed and verily believe was in the
case of Dr. Geagea accompanied by torture, and in particular to
Mr. E1 Khoury. I understand that a similar complaint was also made
by Mr. Malek.
2.9 Upon the initial
presentation of the indictment it was noted that there were
defendants, viz. Atonios Obeid, Rushdi Raad, Jean Chahine, Paul A1
Fahel and Rafik A1 Fahel, who the judgment refers to as "declining
to appear at the Council" It is my understanding that rather than
declining to appear, they were not sought with a view to ensuring
their appearance and in particular feared their ability to obtain
a fair and just trial, and in the case of Mr. Antonios Obeid, he
had his passport detained at the Lebanese Consulate in Sydney on
making inquiries of the charges laid against him. The subterfuge
given by the consulate was that they were attempting to
investigate his passport validity and having taken it into their
possession refused to give it back. Similarly Mr. Chahine felt no
confidence in so submitting himself when he saw how Mr. Obeid was
treated. Mr. Chahine also made a complaint as to the loss of his
passport through the offices of the Lebanese Consulate in Sydney.
2.10 The Court insofar as it
purported to give them a concession to attend the trial,
thereafter deemed them to be escapees and or fugitives from
justice and then tried them in their absence on the basis that
they did not comply with a request in the form of a concession to
attend and appear in the hearing of the matter.
2.11 In these circumstances,
justifiably in view of the treatment by the Lebanese Consulate in
Sydney, the gravity of the allegations bearing in mind that the
accused tried in absentia were as their defence sought to show,
absent from the jurisdiction at the critical times of the alleged
complicity by themselves, very much in fear of their safety and
apprehensive that they would receive a fair trail. No arrest
having been issued for them, but rather a concession given to
enable them to attend in the circumstances they not unnaturally
chose to preserve their life and liberty and declined to respond
to any request of the Lebanese Government and or the Court to
return to Lebanon, this was very much so compounded by the fact
that the withdrawal of the passports would ensure that they had no
chance of having their mobility for international travel restored
once they were in Lebanon.
2.12 Similarly the requests
made of the A1 Fahei brothers Were not pursued with any vigour
until it was sought to have Mr. E1 Khoury's retraction of his
confession put into doubt by the attempted extradition by Mr.
Rafik A1 Fahel from Sweden which was refused and which saw the
trial proceed thereafter to a Conviction of Mr. El Khoury despite
his retraction of the alleged confession and his allegations of
torture.
2.13 The position concerning
Mr. Raad in Canada is even more tenuous bearing in mind that he
had left Lebanon several years prior to the bombing of the Church
and which was well documented by the Canadian authorities,
consideration of which will be given in this report to the
particularmaterial to show that he was conclusively nowhere :near
Lebanon at the time of the alleged perpetration of this offence
and even in its planning stages, but was allegedly placed in and
around Lebanon, with very detailed descriptions of his alleged
complicity in the crime.
2.14 In any event all accused
having been indicted, those present were tried in the manner
referred to above and those who declined the invitation to appear
where tried in their absence. The manner in which the trial was
conducted is given at page 4 of the Judgment where it is recited
that the preliminary and preparatory investigation minutes,
together with the case documents, there tabling for discussions,
the interrogations of the Defendants, and the hearing or the
witnesses statements, together with summing up by the prosecution
and the submissions of the defence lawyers, where all conducted
and ultimately deliberated on by the Court arriving at its
verdict, recorded in the Judgment and sentence pronounced on each
of the accused at pp. 111-114.
3.0
POLITICAL AGENDA
3.1 That the highest Court in
Lebanon should allow itself to become a conduit for political
parlance and propaganda in of all matters a trial for crimes
against the State carrying penalties as serious as capital
punishment is tragic.
3.2 This occurred in the
trial of the accused and is borne out in the references made by
the Court at pp. 6/7 where the Court referred to Lebanon as a
civilised country, taking 'pride in the coexistence among all its
citizens and showing the world that Lebanon was a country of great
example as a tolerant nation of all who resided within her
borders.
3.3 The Court thereafter
refereed to the State of Israel as "the Israeli enemy, which has
evil intentions for Lebanon's success, either in future or
economic progress, so it worked to destroy Lebanon, with the
assistance of professional agents and, for the abortion of Lebanon
security as a result of which the useless war took place." That a
Court should condescend to such language and to refer to
neighbouring sovereign States in such a manner is both tragic and
regrettable where at heart and at issue is the attainment of
justice in the contest between the State and the accused to ensure
that the path to truth is trod carefully and surely. To allow the
puerile proliferation of politics into such a consideration in the
reference made to Israel and the intentions that were perceived by
the Court to be the destruction of the Lebanese State by Israel
whether founded or unfounded, has no place in a Court of law.
3.4. This was the template
for the consideration of the matters against each of the accused,
both present and in absentia and seen as the motive for bringing
about the possession, distribution and use of the weapons,
together with the planting of the bomb.
3.5 Throughout the judgment
there are many references to the accused, in
particular, Mr. E1 Khoury, Dr. Geagea (seen on an Israeli Warship)
and Mr Chahine, Mr Obeid and Mr. Raad, all meeting at hotels
and/or in establishments in the State of Israel. Also there are
references to the arranging of visas at frontier zones controlled
by Israel and the admiration of the Israeli State and its language
by Mr Khoury. To leave nothing out of the epic proportions within
which the State of Israel's involvement is seen, there also crept
into the judgment the alleged romance between Mr E1 Khoury and a
Miss Oria, (an Israeli Agent), seen particularly as a development
on the "human side", within the matrix of the facts, acts and
circumstances.
3.6 Each and every sighting
of the accused in the State of Israel, together with the
particular inferences and ultimate findings of fact derived from
such references, were remarkably unsubstantiated by documentary
material. They were also pictured as devoid of factual
corroboration, and in Mr E1 Khoury's case were extracted as a
result of being obtained under torture in confessions obtained
from him which were later retracted. As to the sighting of Mr Raad,
Mr Obeid and Mr Chahine, each of these references were similarly
lacking in corroborative confirmation.
3.7 The presence of Israel's
involvement was juxtaposed as one of the reasons for the
cancellation of the visit of His Holiness. It was also cited as
the continuing festering cause for dissension in the stability and
attainment of peace in Lebanon.
3.8 There was also reference
to the concept of the Canton system that is operative in
Switzerland and much approved by Dr. Geagea as a possible future
model for Lebanon. This was refereed to by the Court as the
"Mini-State Concept", and was if not explicitly then certainly
inferentially derided and adds to the political prose which
literally abounds in the judgment and in particular is
condemnatory of the accused, Dr. Geagea, and his role as a
Christian leader which is perceived as nothing more than a
nuisance value by the Court and one responsible for national
division and turmoil.
3.9 The Court in giving in to
what is obviously a submission which ignores facts and refuses to
look at the evidence, becomes a proselyte of the political parody
and the Judges in turn regrettably become puppets in the theatre
of a trial which is seeking to make excuses for the inability to
achieve a just and sensible political solution to a nation's woes.
In turn it is a reflex response to those who ultimately control
and administer Lebanon and are hell bent on repressing the
expression of freedom of speech and seek to emasculate those who
differ with the regime.
3.10 Such an intrusion into
politics abrogates utterly and convincingly any attempt to
administer justice and achieve a fair trial between the interests
of the State and the accused. It impacts on article six of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter
ICCPR), in particular that the death penalty could be imposed is
in breach of Part III, article 6(2) and also is in breach of
article 7, where it could be established that a person was
tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. This must be said of the treatment of Mr El Khoury as
it emerged in the course of the trial.
3.11 In addition to the failure
by the Court to implement article 6 of Part III of the ICCPR it
also infringed, we would submit, the fact that the penalty was
imposed in breach of the Covenants injunction that no such penalty
was to be passed, unless it was pursuant to a final judgment. This
could never be the case in question because the final judgment was
incapable of review by an Appellate Court, as the Judicial Council
is the Supreme Court from which there is no appeal, and thus it is
in breach of article 14 (5) of the ICCPR.
3.12 It is now proposed to
consider each of the cases of the accused and in such detail as is
necessary to exemplify the propositions advanced and to highlight
the considerations that we say are applicable to the matters at
hand.
4.0
GIRGES EL KHOURY
4.1 The prime sources of evidence
against Mr. El Khoury were as follows:
a). His alleged confession and an
enactment of the crime, 28 March 1994, which he did in person at
the Chief of Staff Building together with drawings that he made
placing the Defendants' in absentia at that area.
b). Evidence derived from his
frequent visits to Israel - seven.
c). The involvement with a girl
called, Manassa, also known as Ms Vera Oria and;
d). The evidence of
contradictions which the accused gave in response to questions in
the interrogatory procedures and in the course of final
investigations conducted prior to the trial Generally.
4.2 The defence of Mr E1
Khoury was given at pp. 19-26.
4.3 There were both oral and
written submissions prepared on this Defendant's behalf.
4.4 Essentially the circumstances in which Mr. El Khoury found
himself were as a result of the bombing of the Church, he became a
suspect, but for no particular reason. He was alleged to have had
contacts with Israel, and when his family where set upon by the
authorities, he came out of hiding and was taken into custody. The
custody that he was taken into was of a military and not civil
nature, and hence was highlighted by his defence as being in
breach of the provisions and violated articles 47 & 99 of the
Criminal Trials Act and accordingly should have been annulled as a
defective action and/or step taken in the prosecution of Mr. E1
Khoury pursuant to article 340 of the Criminal Trials Act. The
investigation was of itself conducted at a military
camp/establishment, and was tainted by the subjection of Mr. El
Khoury to psychological, physical and extreme bouts of mental and
physical violence in an effort to extract a confession -which was
ultimately successful - but which was finally retracted when Mr.
E1 Khoury would have confidently assumed that a Court of law would
have assessed his retraction for what it was worth, namely an
explanation of the response that he gave under severe mental and
physical pressure and which he sought to retract at the first
available public opportunity. He was denied his lawyer or the
presence of a legal adviser in violation of article 71, such
exclusion of a legal representative was to enable the authorities
to obtain a confession and each in turn, that is to say the civil
prosecutorial authority and the military authority, competed
against each other to obtain such a confession.
4.5 The contradictions that
were utilised by the Court ultimately to convict Mr. E1 Khoury
were to say the least ridiculous. They refer to the fact that no
one can act on a confession as conclusive and in accordance with
the manner in which it is treated by the Lebanese domestic
criminal law, unless it is supported by other evidence, i.e.,
corroborated. That such is a universal application of the criminal
law in any system, whether it is adversarial or inquisitorial, is
a trite observation. The defence sought to set up the fact that
the accused would have hardly had the facility and/or the mobility
to travel to Israel on the numerous occasions that they allege he
said he did, and more particularly, that his confession was to be
seen for what it was, namely, a matter that was extracted by
torture and/or physical abuse and violence because of the fact
that in the circumstance the presence of Raad, Obeid and Chahine
was physically impossible both as to the frequency of sightings
and the localities in question in view of the affidavit evidence
presented by each of those co-accused and which were relied upon
by this Defendant as well as in Dr. Geagea's case.
4.6 An enactment - by a
person in custody, and one who is allegedly being tortured is
hardly surprising. That he should then carry on with the thespian
portrayal of not only acting out the scenario, but, resorting to
the graphic and pictorial depiction of such events and referring
to other incidents which he put in a diagram and signed, is hardly
convincing and/or corroborative, even though it was accepted as
being the basic requirement by the Court. In other words to hold
up what is the principle, and then find that the same Zhad been
complied with on the most pathetic of material, and implausibly
so, is to make a mockery of justice as the judicial council did in
the case at bar. The reliance on Ms Antoinette Chahine, whose
whereabouts is still unknown, having been taken into custody and
held without trial and charge being preferred against her, (sister
of co-accused Jean Chahine) is equally incapable we would submit,
of supporting the States ultimate findings. In fact her evidence
was in support of Mr El Khoury and her brother that they were not
in Lebanon, ie, the brother and Mr E1 Khoury, as referred to and
that Mr Chahine was for some time and more particularly at the
pertinent times, in Cyprus, which he deposed to in his affidavit.
4.7 Mr. E1 Khoury's position
was that effectively he had been tortured, and he maintained the
same at the trial, and the medical evidence was inconclusive to
refute such claims. That he did not come to trial and was not
publicly arraigned or seen from the time Of his arrest in March
1994 until the trial in November 1994 is ample evidence of the
fact that there was both opportunity and motive to enable the
carrying out of the torture at the military establishment of Yarzi
as was maintained and occurred. The medical evidence to refute
such claims as advanced by the State was both mediocre and devoid
of any documentary proof corroborating the same. No medical
records and/or independent examination by a doctor of the
accused's choice or alternatively, a doctor agreed upon by both
parties mutually, was made available to refute convincingly the
claims of torture which were maintained and adhered to by Mr. El
Khoury throughout the trial. The Court dealt with Mr. El Khoury's
defence at pp. 66 - 81. It was to say the least disheartening in
its attempt to treat the defence case with any respect. The Court
relied on, and gave evidence to the alleged involvement by Mr. E1
Khoury with the State of Israel, and in particular his enlisting
in its Intelligence Service. Despite the fact that he had alibi
material presented from the French Cultural Centre for his
whereabouts on certain occasions, this was disregarded. Pathetic
and desperate were the attempts to stretch tenuous facts into
ultimate findings can be seen from the use of identikit pictures
of the co-accused drawn by this accused and in particular putting
glasses on Mr. Raad who I am informed and verily believe, having
met the person and having spoken to him on lengthy occasions in
Montreal where he is presently residing, that he has never worn
glasses in his life. To so say that because he put glasses on him
in the identikit picture that convincingly showed that he knew Mr.
Rushdi Raad is a bizarre example of the judicial process gone
askew. It is hardly an example of inductive reasoning. The alleged
depiction of the Church and its details as drawn by this accused
and the absence between what it was like before and after the
bombing are hardly capable, bearing in mind the scenario in which
they came about (torture and he being in custody without bail and
Without any prospect of being placed in a civilian establishment
as opposed to a military establishment), would hardly lend
credence as pieces of evidence that are sufficiently
corroborative, both independently and of their own weight. Also
relied upon was the evidence of his brother, Anwar. El. Khoury and
his relationship with the Israeli authorities and his acquaintance
with Ms Vera Oria and most convincingly the eventual "development
of a love affair between them" - p. 71. Coupled with this is his
alleged flight and his disappearance. His response to this was, in
view of the focus of attention of the government on former
Lebanese Forces members, puts his flight as both understandable
and a rationale response in the circumstances. This of course was
not so regarded and more particularly the Court in attempting to
analyse the evidence at pp. 72 - 81, systematically, clumsily but
convincingly tore out the logic and rationale of each and every
proposition that was posited by the defence, and in particular,
where evidence supported the defence it was ridiculed and reduced
with comments which rendered the assessment of it absurd on the
part of the Court, in their desperate efforts to reduce his
defence thus making a mockery of it in its ultimate rejection.
4.8 The confession was
attended by torture and gross abuse of the position that the
authorities were in having the care and custody of the Defendant
as their prisoner pending investigation and ultimately being
charged. The report of Dr Kahwahji, who conducted a bedside
examination of this accused, surprisingly did not find, "any
traces of bashing or torture". p.72. Remarkably Dr Kahwahji found
that his answers and his mental status were both sound and his
detention during the remaining period and in particular his health
during that detention Was without any remarkable change.
Incidentally, his psychological status remained calm as at the
initial stages of the examination when he was first taken into
custody, as compared to the sighting of him in the video when
played before the Court, concerning his enactment of the scenario.
4.9 The incredulity of the
Judicial Council is only outdone by their attempt to belie what
were the facts and circumstances made in support of the allegation
of torture and ill treatment. Article 7 of Part III of ICCPR
specifically injuncts the subjection to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. There was a gross
breach if one accepts Mr. E1 Khoury's testimony and the
submissions made by his lawyers who were both responsible and
admirably competent in the presentation of his case. The claim by
the defence was rejected out of hand by the Court without any
support both rational and/or logical relying on any corroborative
material to so disavow the defence claim.
4.10 It is often asserted
that assaults on the inherent dignity of human beings as
recognised as being relevant to the stability of international
order. It follows that a profound transformation of international
relations has been heralded with profound transformation of
International Law, because ultimately, the rules of behaviour of
society and the aims in which they are so regulated has seen the
evolution of humanitarian law rules to reduce and eradicate what
occurred to Mr. El Khoury.
4.11 He is a prisoner within
the term, as has evolved in International Law, as a person who is
unable to remove themselves from the orbit of official action and
abuse. The concept of torture has been one which traditionally is
referred to as a method of arriving at the truth, of determining
responsibility for offences by means of eliciting confessions or
other information. Less obviously, it has also become a method of
inspiring fear among the population at large, or specific segments
of it. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it provides
that:
a). Article 3. Everyone has the
right, liberty and security of person.
b). Article 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
c). Article 9. No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or
detention...
4.12 Each of these provisions
was so breached in the case of Mr. E1 Khoury and in that regard
with respect to all Defendants who were in custody.
4.13 Mr. E1 Khoury is seen as
a typical victim of torture, in other words, he is a political
opponent of the government - violent or non-violent, a real force
for change or a minor irritant to the regime, seized by the
security forces. These as in the case in question may be military
or police (or both acting together) but will more commonly be the
military, who may or may not be in uniform. Their vehicles may or
may not have number plates and frequently, although not
inevitably, the government of the State concerned will have been
ousted unconstitutionally by the armed forces, which can then
operate free of restraint. They may well be there at the grace and
favour of an occupying force, ever present, but seemingly benign
in its attendance to supervising the administration, but without
being seen to take an active part.
4.14 The scenario as occurred
to Mr. E1 Khoury and for that matter Dr. Geagea and Mr. Malek, is
both Composite and consistent of what occurs generally in barbaric
regimes where the administration of justice is nothing more than a
sinecure to the ultimate aims of the State and is used as a
perfidious and political panacea albeit an adjunct as a piece of
panoply.
4.15 Invariably, once seized,
a prisoner is transported to a place of detention, which may be a
police station, or in this case an army barracks where the torture
and the ill-treatment will take place unless already started
during the transportation. The methods are as infinite as the
reaches of the human imagination, but among the more common are
prolonged beatings, especially on the soles of the feet or
genitals, immersion in excrement, near-asphyxiation, violent
sexual assault, and the administering of electrical shocks. More
sophisticated in that they leave little physical trace. Under
psychological techniques, deprivation of light (or of darkness),
deprivation of sound, of sleep, general disorientation, threats of
mutilation or death, mock execution and most powerful of all, in
many cases, the threat of physical abuse would be extended to
persons close to the prisoner.
4.16 Torture is usually aimed
at securing information about the activities of the victim, or
persons connected with the victim. The activities in question may
be thought to relate to the commission of criminal offences (with
or without political connections), or the planned commission of
such offences, or simply to political dissent that the authorities
are not prepared to tolerate. The torture is also often aimed at
securing confessions to criminal acts. Another purpose is the
intimidation of the victim and others, possibly even society as a
whole, so as to deter people from undertaking an activity that
could risk their falling into the hands of the authorities.
4.17 Torture is usually
carried out while the victim is excluded from any contact with the
outside world. Family, doctor, lawyer, and so on - a condition
known as detention incommunicado. The period is often prolonged,
measured in weeks and months rather than in days, (though, of
course, a lot of suffering maybe inflicted in a period of days
even hours). The incommunicado detention may, like the torture
itself, be frankly illegal under the law of the country in
question. Sometimes the authorities will facilitate the
perpetration of torture by declaring a state of siege or emergency
in order to permit the suspension of legal guarantees that could
have acted as checks.
4.18 That each of the above
items, as indicia of a repressive regime can be applied to the
Lebanese Government is both apt and sound on instructions received
by me from refugees presently situated in Canada, America,
Australia and the United Kingdom. That I have participated in such
refugee hearings and prepared a report which has been accepted by
authorities in Sweden, Australia and Canada and have given
evidence in the United Kingdom with a decision pending, is
confirmatory, sufficient for me to make the observations that I do
that I accept what Mr El Khoury has said and in particular having
spoken to him briefly and under pain of punishment on the basis
that soldiers would have if they had found me so talking to him,
physically removed me, from the precincts of the Court, enables me
sufficiently to believe what his lawyers put on instructions and
also with respect to the Defendant himself.
4.19 Analysing the reasons
for the rejection of the claims made by this accused by the Court,
leads me to the inevitable conclusion that the just and rational
approach to justice, objective and devoid of sympathy and/or
political preference was not arrived at by the Court in the
consideration of Mr El Khoury's case.
4.20 To say that he was
motivated by instinct to survive, the death penalty and hence make
the confessions he did, is to answer the obvious, that under the
fear of execution and the arbitrary denial of just and due process
together with the physical and mental torture exacted on him, was
the real motive for the confessions initially, and then their
retraction. Why otherwise would he be so prepared to retract a
confession that would enable and assure him of his preservation of
life and possible early restoration of liberty? To so publicly
decry the confession as obtained by torture and fraud is to fly in
the face of logic and reason other than it was both a false and
wrongly obtained confession.
4.21 To display him as a spy
for both Israel and the Lebanese Forces, and thus an enemy of the
State is only to appease the political politburo and to become a
proselyte of regimes that occupy Lebanon and seek to have Lebanon
bend to their will in contra distinction to their acclaimed
sovereign status and democratic ideals. It indeed makes hollow and
a mockery of the remarks of the Judicial Council that Lebanon is
both free and democratic where a just and fair trial is available
to all who Come before the Courts. See p. 6.
4.22 The Court certainly gave
some emphasis and placed a degree of focus on the motive for
retracting his confession at p. 79. It is to be noted that Mr E1
Khoury's confession was retracted on the first opportunity after
the Indictment Decree handed down on 13 June 1994, and prior to
him being a witness in the hearing of an associated case which was
to commence on 23 June 1994, in relation to the bombing of a
building known as A1 Kataeb House. That it was prompt and that he
was consistent in denouncing the confession cannot be argued with.
That the Judicial Council did not give such emphasis and consider
such retraction on other than a nonsensical basis, is also
apparent. In short, their ultimate conclusion was as follows:
"The Council remained confident
that Girges' confessions in regard to the main points of the case
were true and that these confessions with its supportive elements
are enough to prove the actions attributed to Girges, which appear
in the Chapter of Facts." P.80
Those facts were his complicity
as an agent of enemies both within and outside the State and the
fact that he took money for his intelligence service and was
prepared to denounce the State and act against it. All ethereal
and fanciful and more particularly obnoxious to the cause of
attaining justice as was incumbent on the Judicial Council.
4.23 When the template of his
conspiratorial co-operation and the acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy and the perpetration of the matters in question are
taken into account and in particular looked at as regards the
co-ordination between him and the accused in absentia and their
defences are also under the microscope, it is patently obvious
that the following propositions are available:
i) He could not
have been with the co-accused, especially those in absentia on the
days and in the periods in question or at the locations;
ii) That if he so maintained it,
bearing in mind that he was taken into detention, it was in
circumstances where he was and is to be regarded as a victim of a
miscarriage of justice on the basis that the confession obtained
from him was and should be seen for what it was, namely, no
confession at all, or certainly not voluntarily given;
iii) That there is both a
reasonable and rationale explanation for the confession and its
extraction, and this in turn leads to a doubt when compared to the
lack of presence of the co-accused as against the intimately
particular and meticulous narration of their involvement and
presence, plausibly explained away by reason of the extraction of
the confession -thus leaving inevitably the conclusion that the
doubt must be not only in favour of this accused, but his
co-accused, including Dr. Geagea and Mr. Malek, and the accused in
absentia.
4.24 The Judicial Council in
failing to appreciate the Process and in failing to accord to the
affidavit material the force and the tenor on which they were
sworn have denied this accused the ability to present his defence
and thereby denied him a fair and just trial and insofar as their
verdict is incapable of review by a High Court in breach of
article 14 (5) of ICCPR has rendered the verdict unsafe and
unsatisfactory for the reason that it was so unsafe and so
unsatisfactory in being arrived at and insofar as it is allowed to
remain so by the denial of a review of a appellate authority is
equally offensive to the notions of justice and the international
obligations to which Lebanon is a signatory.
5.0
ACCUSED IN ABSENTIA
5.1 The accused in absentia
are Jean Chahine, Antonios Obeid and Rushdi Raad and the A1 Fahel
brothers.
5.2 Affidavit evidence was
presented and compiled by myself in respect of Obeid and Chahine
and representations were made on behalf of Al Fahel in Sweden and
I also liaised with Rushdi Raad's lawyers in Canada and he himself
personally as to the preparation of affidavit material by him and
its provision to the judicial authorities and the prosecution in
Lebanon.
5.3 That the dissemination of
the material was both universal, that is to both the State and
prosecutor and to each of the other Defendants and that it was
open, as confirmatory with corroborative material annexed thereto
is to underestimate the extent to which the preparations were made
and attended to in the provision of the material in question. This
is in no way, in any sense to justify the material or the manner
or the state of it as presented, but rather to indicate that what
was made available was done with the best possible resources co-ordinated
and provided bearing in mind there were time constraints in the
provision of this material and its consideration.
5.4 The Judicial Council's
complaint that no one came to support the affidavit material is
absurd for these reasons:
a) Insofar as I was concerned, I
was denied and still am denied a visa to attend and visit Lebanon
for any purpose, so how could I having applied for a visa in March
1995 and still have unanswered my application for such a visa
(although I am informed and verily believe on reliable sources
that the same is denied to me as I am on a black list and in fact
am referred to as No. 3 on that list). How could I hope to attend
and participate in the forensic process?
b) The treatment afforded to
Obeid and Chahine by the deprivation of their passports and the
ill-treatment afforded to their co-accused, would leave them with
no hope or without any degree of optimism that they would not also
be treated in a like manner must of itself weigh on their minds as
to why they would not seek to surrender themselves, and;
c) The treatment of the affidavit
material in the judgment and in particular the conscious disregard
to refer to the itemisation of the matters in the affidavit, to so
regard it as, if not directly then inferentially as a fraud, and
to denounce the material without referring to it in particular
manner but to generally disclaim it as opposed to the meticulous
treatment of the prosecution's evidence, is to highlight the
dishonesty that permeated the judicial approach and ultimate
conclusion that was arrived at.
5.5 It is apparent in the
course of the judgment that all defendants in absentia were
regarded as one category and so treated in the judgment. The
"infamous three" - Obeid, Raad and Chahine were all regarded as
escapees from justice and it was held against them that as they
had not seen fit to discuss or offer an opportunity for the
discussion of their evidence with the authorities then they would
be tried in their absence. Needless to say it was akin to the
vernacular expression, "shooting fish in a barrel" It had all of
the trappings of what we refer to in Australia as a "Kangaroo
Court". It was both a farce and a mockery and constituted nothing
more than a rubber stamp insofar as they were convicted.
5.6 Of special interest and
when read and reflected on in utter disbelief, is the comment and
the finding of the Court at page 85, where it held that the fact
that there were no exits visas in the relevant passports meant,
that that of itself did not mean that false passports were used or
that the countries in question were not efficient enough in
maintaining exit records. The Republic of Cyprus, and the
situation pertaining in Canada, Sweden and Australia are
sufficient to my knowledge to indicate that the migration and
immigration procedures are so monitored and of such sophistication
that the obtaining of a false passport, whilst not out of the
question, would make it virtually impossible for either of these
defendants. More particularly, the records of the governments in
question, and when one utilises reference to the affidavits in
question for each of the clients that I was privy to, it is
patently obvious that the reference by the Judicial Council that,
"both cases could not constitute a definite evidence that the
person has actually remained in that country, because of his
passport and the stamps appearing on it." - P.85. It is
regrettable that judicial expositions of this nature are needed
to, to resort to imposing a decision that is neither based in
logic nor reason. Equally to the point that nowhere in the
affidavit material is any fact or matter addressed concerning the
issues such as Mr Chahine residing in a unit in Cyprus and the
further affidavit by his landlord, confirming the same. Likewise
with Mr Raad, running a business in Canada and Mr Obeid conducting
transactions in Australia, significantly, buying a home, attending
doctors and generally being in and with his family, having entered
Australia in June 1993 and not having gone from its shores. How
then does the Judicial Council explain that the persons abroad
remained unreliable evidence when either for reasons of their
personal safety or in my case the fact that I was not able to be
given a visa, all render the matter of the need for attendance
hypocritical where it is relied on for the need to give evidence
viva voce.
5.7 The percolation of this
denial and rejection of the alibi material in relation to the
persons referred to is equally seen in the rejection of it in Mr
E1 Khoury's defence. The Court was adamant that it would rely on
what had been reported in Mr. E1 Khoury's confessions against the
defendants, as long as the confessions were convincing in their
details. To be convincing is one thing To be coerced and lacking
in corroboration is another and this was not averted to by the
Court, rather they held the view that: "...[it] consolidated by
the factual evidence derived from the past dealings amongst them
all" - P.86.
5.8 In the circumstances it
is absolutely imperative that in any review of the verdicts
against the gentlemen concerned in this section of my report, it
must be noted that no opportunity was given nor any gesture made
to take the evidence on commission or alternately to have whatever
I collected and collated tested by an opportunity for me to give
evidence and to be cross-examined on the same, or to make an
independent investigation of the materials through consulate
officials in the various countries concerned. To dismiss the
matters on the basis that if one were not to attend, irrespective
of whether one could physically be able to go to the Court, is to
yet again conveniently remove from serious consideration the
matters at hand. In all it was a gross miscarriage of justice and
against evidence which must render the verdict unsafe and
unsatisfactory as applies to each of these persons.
6.0
SAMIR GEAGEA
6.1 The position of this
Defendant is that he was acquitted of the capital charge, but
convicted of firearm offences and sentenced to ten years in
prison. It was utterly unbelievable, bearing in mind that the odds
were against this defendant securing an acquittal and especially
when one reads the balance of the judgment as to how the other
defendants: were treated if he was at the apex and they were
serving underneath him.
6.2 Reliance was had by the
Judicial Council on the establishment of what they refer to as a
sham party. It was seen as a political subterfuge to establish a
party which despite being pronounced as established for political
purposes, was in reality the old militia but hid by the penumbra
of a political party. It was alleged that Geagea paid wages, kept
staff on and conducted the security apparatus with Mr. Touma. Mr.
Touma, I am informed and verily believe, was in America, and had
been for some time.
6.3 The evidence continued to
establish and ultimately lead for consideration by the Court that
Geagea had collaborated in and actively counselled and/or procured
the accumulation of weapons, in line with the Lebanese Forces
Party which in turn was a cover for the Lebanese Forces. As well
there were active training programs in intelligence, mapping, and
weapons operation. There was a cover set-up allegedly as a scout
group, known as, Al Moustakbal Scouts, as well as the running of
the Ghosta Military Academy.
6.4 Generally the Court
looked at each of the matters that it referred to earlier in
respect of Mr. Khoury and the other defendants grouped and
discussed above, but came to a conclusion that even though the
Church bombing was an operation which was an organised crime,
which would have had commanders, planners, and those who would
ultimately execute it, Dr. Geagea's participation therein was not
as integral or as principally positioned as was first thought.
While it is conceded in the Judgment that he made capital of the
bombing and would have used the opportunity presented by it, it is
important to note that prior to the bombing of the Church, Dr
Geagea had not come under any suspicion for any of the crimes that
he has been previously tried with, or is currently standing trial
for. And yet the Church was the catalyst that led to his
incarceration and to the determination of matters which one would
have thought were covered by a general amnesty. It is important in
this regard to note that at the time of writing this opinion and
analyse of the case at hand, one of the former prosecutors has
conceded that the trials given to Dr. Geagea in the past were far
from fair and he has publicly apologised and indicated that he no
longer wishes to be identified with the States legal team. I refer
to the press conference of Mr. Rizk, which I understand has been
disseminated to various organisations and a copy of which will be
made available to those who having read this report could access
it at the same time.
6.5 Ultimately the Court gave
to Dr. Geagea the benefit of the doubt on the basis that whilst
there were planners and organisers of the bombing operation they
could not give any certain role to Samir Geagea neither in co-ordinating
nor in planning and executing the operation. Ultimately they came
to the conclusion that: "As a result, Council has doubts about the
participation of the defendant, Samir Geagea in the Church bombing
operation. These doubts should benefit the defendant and lead to
the declaration of his innocence."
6.6 However, such doubts did
not arise when it came to the amassing of weapons and the
conducting of sham political party which was a disguise for the
continuation of the militia. This to my mind is a contradiction in
terms, where the evidence is preferred for one conclusion but not
the other, when they are both equally capable of the logical
conclusion that bears uniformity in the innocence of the alleged
perpetrator as opposed to his conviction on one and acquittal on
the other. Why is it not that the doubts that existed for the
denial and ultimate acquittal of Dr. Geagea in the Church bombing,
also remain the same for the possession of weapons, conduct of a
militia and the various other matters that were seen fit to render
him liable, when in fact and in substance, the evidence was
sufficiently incomprehensible and unconvincing to allow an
acquittal? One can only say that the answer lies in the genesis of
the trial being one of a political witch hunt and ultimately a
conviction on a lesser charge and the acquittal on the main
charge, will both, (hopefully), place the prosecution and the
Judicial Council in a benign and seemingly just light, as opposed
to the calamitous catastrophe resulting in the gross miscarriage
of justice that has occurred.
6.7 In reality the verdict
was both unsafe and unsatisfactory for Dr. Geagea on the very
critical basis that leaving aside the absurd conviction of the
other defendants in the face of their overwhelming alibi evidence
and the fact that E1 Khoury's conviction was tainted by his
confession and should similarly have been rejected, the conviction
of Dr. Geagea has massive and mammoth implications akin to the
"Guilford Six" and "Birmingham Four" - UK. This occurred in a
regime which is judicially far better organised with much more
safeguards and entrenched Appellate review; and still was
overturned as being found to be procured in circumstances which
rendered it unsafe and unsatisfactory. Here in stark contrast
there is no such recourse to any review procedure either Appellate
or independent thereof and for these reasons the procedure stands
damned as being in gross violation of article 14(5) of the ICCPR.
6.8 Nothing further need be
entered into to discuss what is already well and truly fallowed
turf. It remains to be said though that even with organisations
that are loathe to embark upon and enter into matters which have
been the subject of domestic remedies and conducted by legal
systems within those domestic forums, here there was such a gross
departure from what was the minimum required, pursuant to article
14(5) of the ICCPR that it requires close and careful scrutiny and
sustained protest. Accordingly, this report should be disseminated
to organisations who have been receptive and for which the writer
has been extremely grateful such as Amnesty International, the
Human Rights Committee of the Congress of the United States, the
European Union Human Rights Commission and of course to the
particular governments of Australia, Cyprus, the United States,
Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom, who have patiently and
properly received the reports for their own international advices
but which would not cause any redress for the parties concerned.
6.9 Of special interest, this
report is in part dedicated to all of those people who have
assisted me from the Lebanese Forces and the political wing of
that party and in particular to Mrs. Samir Geagea and all of Dr.
Geagea's workers throughout the world who actively campaign and
properly organise themselves for the attainment of peace and
justice by lawful means, as opposed to resorting to activities
which would belie the respect for the system of law and order that
Dr. Geagea maintains and holds firm. Of special interest and the
recognition of that interest this report is equally dedicated to
His Beatitude Cardinal Boutros Nasrallah Sfeir whose campaign for
truth and justice in the name of God and the Maronite Church is
especially warmly regarded and acknowledged in his tireless
efforts and campaign on behalf of all Lebanese citizens for
democracy and just government.
20 November 1996
STEPHEN J. STANTON |