Lebanese Information CENTER

  April 2000

Since 1990, Lebanon has being subjected to a premeditated process of assimilation and absorption targeting its institutions, structure, history and geography. The country almost completely lost its status of a Sovereign Nation whilst being kept on the maps of Geography books and Atlases.

Throughout the last decade, Lebanon was being amassed according to the Syrian exclusive vision responding completely to its will and dictate.

It becomes essential, therefore, to describe in detail the elements of this process of assimilation in an attempt to find pertinent and timely solutions before it becomes too late.

1-     On the Demographic level

 Demography is the most important structural element of the Country with prevalent and widespread results upon all the other elements. Our areas of great concern are as follows:

A-Emigration

It is worthy to mention that during the Lebanese war (between spring 1975 and fall 1990), more than four hundred thousand Lebanese (400,000) emigrated away from Lebanon and settled permanently in distant countries such as Canada, Australia, the United States of America and South America. The total population of Lebanon is three million and five hundred thousand (3,500,000).

According to official statistics issued by the Deputy Chairman of the Board of Development and Construction Dr Boutros Labaki, the number of Lebanese that permanently emigrated away from Lebanon since 1991(i.e. after the war ended) is eight hundred and twenty thousand Lebanese (820,000). This includes one hundred and seventy thousand (170,000) who left in 1997 and one hundred and eighty thousand (180,000) who emigrated in 1998.

The statistics also show that sixteen percent (16%) of emigrants were from the Bekaa Region, nineteen and six percent (19.6%) from Beirut, twenty two and two percent (22.2%) from the North, nineteen and three percent (19.3%) from the South and seventeen and three percent (17.3%) from Mount Lebanon. Within all these groups, Christian emigrants are by far more numerous. 

Moreover, thirty two percent (32%) of those who emigrated were University graduates whilst their proportion within Lebanon is twenty-two and four percent (22.4%) of total residents.  The same facts apply to Technical school graduates where in the emigrant population they constituted five per cent (5%) whilst they form two and six percent (2.6%) in the resident population. Furthermore, male emigrants exceed in number the females whilst the opposite is true within Lebanon. (Study by the Statistics Expert Dr Anis Abi Farah, published in Haramoun Magazine).

In the recent past, Michel Chiha (a famous Lebanese intellectual) said: “Without emigration Lebanon cannot truly live…but if emigration becomes too large Lebanon might die!” According to the latest statistics, the annual rate of growth of the Lebanese population falls between 1.7% and 2.2% whilst the average annual rate of emigration is around 10%.

A recent study commissioned by the Lebanese Government and prepared by Economist experts Charbel Nahas and Makram Sader, found that sixteen thousand (16,000) Lebanese residents are emigrating every month away from Lebanon whilst only eight thousand (8,000) are being born in the same period. This means that Lebanon is losing around one hundred thousand (100,000) residents annually, (i.e. around one million every decade). This huge gap is presently filled by the injection of non-Lebanese into the country.

Lebanon is thus suffering, since the end of the Lebanese war, from the emigration of its young educated academics. Two thousand (2,000) medical graduates from the American University of Beirut immigrated to the USA alone. This represents an average of medical graduates from that university for a period of 30 years. During the past three years, the number of youth emigrating has increased significantly for the following reasons:

·        The lack of employment opportunities. 

·        The reign of favoritism in every industry even in newly established small businesses.

·        The loss of confidence in Justice and the state of law that should provide equality amongst all citizens.

 B- Naturalization

Whilst the Lebanese were emigrating, the government issued a decree (N°5247) in 1994 allowing the naturalization of around four hundred and fifty thousand (450,000) individuals including twenty seven thousand (27,000) Palestinians, claiming that they belonged to seven Lebanese villages annexed by Israel in 1948, as well as twelve thousand (12,000) Arab gypsies (Study prepared by Nemat Allah Abi Nasr). This decree increased, in one round, the population of Lebanon by 10%.

This fraudulent and illegal decree violated Lebanon’s balanced identity and sensitive idiosyncrasy.  It destroyed the demographic balance and burdened the social security budget. “The majority of the newly naturalized groups don’t even reside on Lebanese territory nor do they share with the Lebanese their traditions and customs, instead they are brought in by the bus load to support the Regime’s instruments in the parliamentary and municipal election periods” (Article by Samir Franjieh 9/8/99).

Furthermore, the naturalization of these numbers of Palestinians is effectively a prelude to the implementation of a further number in the future.  

C- The Palestinians in Lebanon

A number of the Palestinians came into Lebanon as a result of the 1948 war when they took refuge into the neighboring countries; others arrived in Lebanon following the events of “Black September” in Jordan 1970. They consolidated their presence through a number of armed Palestinian organizations and attempted to control Lebanon by interfering into its internal affairs. 

There are no accurate statistics depicting the number of Palestinians residing in Lebanon but records of United Nations Relief And Works Agency (UNRWA) reveal that there are around 370,000 Palestinians whose origins emanate from families that took refuge in Lebanon in 1948. This number represents 10.5% of the total population in Lebanon (Estimates of the Central Bureau of Statistics, published in fall of 1998).  In Syria, Palestinians represent 2.5% of the total Syrian population. 

D-The Displaced

Ten years have gone by and the problem of the displaced within their homeland remains unsolved despite all the promises, conferences, ministries of the displaced, different funds and multiple surveys.  Ironically there is still no agreement on defining “who is the displaced?”  The Lebanese Government does not seem to agree that the displaced is someone who has been torn away from his/her home and land and is still waiting for his/her return and for any solution to materialize. 

The issue was compounded further by the flagrant discrimination in dealing with the communities concerned. Until 1998 the total sum of money paid to repair or rebuild Christian owned properties amounted to 217 billion Lebanese Pounds whilst money paid to vacate properties built or occupied by Moslems exceeded 297 billion L.P.  In Beirut alone, more than 156 billion L.P. were paid to vacate members of the Shiite community.  It is important here to note that Christians constitute 70% of the total number of displaced.  

The whole compensation process was rigged with scandals and great corruption.  The following are a few examples: 

-         Compensation was paid to vacate more than one thousand houses in Kfar Nabrakh (The Chouf District), although the village consists of 180 houses only. 

-         The Syrian Nationalist Social Party received 600,000 US$ in compensation to vacate the occupied Jeanne D’arque Centre in Al Hamra area of Beirut. 

-         Compensation for all (Shiites) residents originating from the frontier Zone in the South was much higher than everywhere else. 

-         The exclusion of the Southern suburbs of Beirut from the government’s plan on the reinstitution of the displaced. This means that the Christians cannot return to their occupied homes in that area. 

-         The inclusion of many villages on the lists of compensation whilst they were never subjected to any displacement. Examples include the villages of Damit, Kfarhim, Kfarfakoud, Daraia, Shehim and Barja.  

-         In a number of villages, another adopted plan entails the payment of some compensation to the Christian owners of houses and lands to help in principle rebuild their properties whilst at the same time they are prevented from returning and residing in their villages which encourages them to emigrate and settle somewhere else. 

-         When President Lahoud took office, the displaced hoped that their cause would be freed from political tutelage. Unfortunately nothing has changed. Recently, President Lahoud reached an agreement with the Druze Socialist Leader Walid Joumblat and rewarded him by reinstating his control over the file of the displaced. This would certainly command much political influence and would provide for elements of pressure and intimidation at the wake of the upcoming Parliamentary elections. 

2-     On the Political level

Lebanon today is a Syrian Protectorate. Under the slogans of “The Unification of the process and Destiny” and “Syria’s Assad”, Lebanon’s political and diplomatic identity is vanishing. 

Whilst no diplomatic representation exists between the two countries, election booths are opened for Syrian nationals in all Lebanese districts and in all the residential and religious areas (especially the Christian areas). 

On Lebanon’s Independence Day, photographs of Syrian President Hafez Assad were placed next to the pictures of the Lebanese President Lahoud; and Syrian flags are hoisted next to the Lebanese ones, even though independence is supposed to symbolize the presence of one flag and one emblem. Moreover, all Syrian national days, such as the anniversaries of the Baath revolution, the correction movement and the October War, are celebrated in Lebanon and are greatly highlighted in Lebanon’s news bulletins. 

From the unification of the two processes towards the unification of the two signatures

This slogan is one of the most prominent headlines of the guided ideological discourse justifying Syrian hegemony over Lebanon.  It is often accompanied by submissions that the Syrian President is a much more experienced negotiator, is much wiser and more aware of Lebanon’s real interests. 

Through its Syrian-appointed political class, Lebanon is dealing with the peace process in complete servitude.  Since the Madrid conference in 1992, Syria was towing the rope for Lebanon whose presence was hardly noticed. As time went by, the official Lebanese position deviated from demanding the withdrawal of the Israeli army from South Lebanon and part of Western Bekaa (during the Herawi Regime), to insisting on Israeli withdrawal from the Syrian Golan Heights as a precondition of peace (Lahoud’s regime since the inauguration address).  

Taking this highly unusual and dangerous position into account, there is a high probability that the peace settlement would be concluded at the expense of Lebanon’s interests. This means that Lebanon would be made to pay the price of the emerging peace as well as having paid so dearly, and much more than any other country, the price for the Arab- Israeli conflict. 

A.     The Parliamentary elections 

In the past ten years two general parliamentary elections took place in 1992 and in 1996.  These elections were characterized by forgery, official list rigging, vote buying and imposed coalitions in order to secure a servile parliamentary majority loyal to Syria. 

Furthermore, an unfair and unequal electoral law was specially tailored to preserve the interests of Syria’s allies. It succeeded in putting the election of the majority of Christian deputies in the hands of the Moslem voters. 

Despite the repeated promises by the Government to offer a more just and equitable election law for the year 2000, the Lebanese were deceived once more by the new law issued on December 14, 1999, which failed dismally in fulfilling such promises and shattered any hope for a better and secure future. 

The new election law fails in the following areas: 

v       Disparities: 

·        Disparity in the standard between districts (muhafazat) whereby no single district is equal to another in the number of its circumscriptions (One district with two circumscriptions in the North and another district with four circumscriptions in Mount Lebanon). 

·        Disparity in the number of deputies in the circumscriptions (The West Bekaa and Beirut have each six deputies whilst the second North circumscription has alone seventeen deputies). 

·        Disparity in the numbers of casas (Kada’a) in each circumscription (One circumscription with one single casa as in the case of both the Shouf and the Northern Maten, whilst another circumscription encompasses five casas as in the case of the second North circumscription including Zgharta, Batroun, Koura, Tripoli and Al Minnieh).  

v            Partitioning a number of districts and dissecting their electorates to distribute them into different circumscriptions in order to falsify the representation of their constituents. This occurred in the following: 

·        Dividing the casa of Tripoli into two sections, (Al Minnieh and AlDinnieh). Each was joined to a separate circumscription. 

·        Tallying the casa of Besharreh, (a totally Christian area) to the casa of Akkar-AlDinnieh, (a predominantly Muslim Sunni area), despite the fact that the two areas are not geographically contiguous or connected in any way. 

·        Dissecting the predominantly Christian casa of Jezzine from its historic and traditionally established district of the South in order to append it to the Nabatieh district (where the vast majority of the constituents are Muslim Shiites).  

·        Separating Beirut into a totally illogical three circumscription aiming to dissipate the blocks of Christian votes and provide the Muslim majority constituents of the newly formed areas with determining control over the Christian seats. 

It is therefore evident that the new election law is not leaving any Christian circumscription within its own natural electoral environment. The Jezzine District, for example, which was historically connected to Saida and now attached to Nabatieh is under the tutelage and control of Amal and Hizbollah; the newly formed Beirut circumscription would lead to the marginalization of the Christian votes whilst in the past they had a sizable and determining influence. In the Mount Lebanon district where the vast majority of the constituents are Christians, the projected divisions would essentially diminish the Christian electoral power in three circumscription out of four: The Shouf circumscription is kept under the control of the Druze leader Walid Jumblat; the Alay and the Southern Maten circumscription are kept under the control of the Shiite and the Druze; whilst the Northern Maten is especially created to provide an area of influence to the Interior Minister, Michel Murr and his partners in the electoral list.   

Moreover, it is quite obvious that joining Besharreh to Akkar and AlDinnieh is designed to sabotage the true representation of its constituents as was demonstrated in the results of the 1998 Municipal Elections where the regime’s allies suffered a crushing and total defeat. 

B.     The Political Parties 

The political parties are virtually absent from the Lebanese arena. The situation in Lebanon looks very similar to the one governing the parties in Syria. Following the dissolution of active parties (Lebanese Forces), the weakening and isolating of others (Lebanese Communist Party), the dismembering of some parties (Al kataeb and Arab Socialist Union) and forcing the unification of others (Syrian Nationalist Social Party), the emerging trend today is to establish a regime’s party shadowed by small groups revolving around it as practiced in Syria with the ruling Baath Party surrounded by the National Progressive Front. Needless to say that in Syria, the Baath rules nominally whilst real control resides in the hands of the military and security services on all key posts in the government.  This is indeed similar to what is taking place in Lebanon’s military regime. 

 

C.     The Military Regime  

Despite President Lahoud’s publicized objections to militarize the government, the facts on the ground are completely different and we find a situation mirroring closely the one prevailing in Syria as shown by: 

-         The appointment of Lieutenant General Assad Ghanem as Director General of Customs, a post that was always occupied by a civilian since its inception.  

-         The appointment of General Jamil Al Sayed as Director General of the General Security Service. This post was traditionally occupied either by Civilians such as Farouk Abi Lamaa and Raymond Roufael or by Officers from within this service such as Zahi Boustani and Antoine Dahdah. Never before a Lebanese officer from the Army headed this department. 

-         The appointment of Lieutenant General Michel Rahbani, the former head of Intelligence, as head of security in the Casino Du Liban assisted by several military officers. 

-         The appointment of Lieutenant General Adonis Neemeh as a member of the committee entrusted with devising a plan for the Lebanese Diaspora. 

-         The appointment of Lieutenant General Maurice Slim as Head of the Media Room at the Presidential Palace. 

-         The appointment of Lieutenant Colonel Gabi Raidi as Director of the Presidential Bureau. 

-         The appointment of General Salem Abu Daher as the President’s Secretary. 

-         The appointment of retired generals Elias Hanna and Abdul Karim Ghandour as members in the Executive Board of the City of Sports. 

-         The allocation of officers to various ministries, public institutions and independent boards exerting real control and management and sending daily progress reports to the Department of Affairs at the Presidential Palace. 

-         The appointment of Khalil Khoury, editor-in-chief of the Army Magazine, as General Director of the National News Agency, although he lacks the adequate qualifications allowing him to assume this position. 

Apart from appointing military personnel in designated positions, The Military Regime diversified its activities to matters copied religiously from the Syrian system: 

-         The allocation of more than the quarter of the country’s budget to the military and security services. 

-         Providing officers with special privileges (medical care, hospitalization, free schools, holiday resorts) making them an advantaged class in Lebanon. 

-         Endowing all the Security services (such as Intelligence, General Security, State Security and Presidential Security Apparatus) with vast powers and influence, allowing them to interfere in all political issues, administrative appointments and monitoring daily activities in the Banking sector. The services even sent “clear messages” to a number of wealthy Lebanese businessmen advising them to make big donations or else face the opening of Court cases against them. (For example, this happened recently to Bishara Nammour who was made to pay a sum of money before he was able to return to Lebanon avoiding hassle and possible imprisonment). 

-         The establishment of a new class of contractors and business partners amongst the military officers.  This class provides protection to local and foreign investors in return for commissions or shares in the companies. This happens also in Syria. 

-         Providing the Security services with the authority to guide and direct the functions of the judiciary by demanding the opening or closure of specific files. This has been compounded further by the decree issued on October 20, 1999, by the Council of Ministers enlisting the officers and members of the State Security Service as part of the Judiciary pertaining to the Investigative Magistrates. It became thus impossible to disprove or challenge any interrogation report submitted by them. 

It is a source embarrassment to utilize the word “service” when we talk about the Security apparatus because the fact remains that the whole Lebanese society is becoming at “the service” of the security agencies. 

E- The Diaspora 

The Lebanese in the Diaspora, with a Christian majority, continue to be marginalized and neglected. They are deprived of their civil and political rights and whenever elections are held, they are not allowed to cast their votes at Lebanese embassies. A Committee was established to prepare an organization plan for the Lebanese in the Diaspora aiming to: 

-         Mobilize the Diaspora into supporting the Lebanese government and the “unification of Process” with Syria. 

-          Monitor Capital and wealth amongst the members of the Diaspora in an attempt to “attract” financial investment and support into the State. 

The plan is executed under the slogan of “consolidating ties on all levels between the emigrants and the homeland”. It consists of performing a detailed survey of all the Lebanese potentials and positions in the Diaspora. Following the Syrian example, the chosen prominent Lebanese would be “encouraged” into participating in the rebuilding and rehabilitation of Lebanon either through intimidation (as we discussed above) or through inducements (exemption from compulsory national service in return for a fee, expected monthly donation, imposing investments within Lebanon upon businesses with established investments abroad, deeming Lebanese emigrants as residents and subject to Lebanese tax on their worldwide income). Furthermore, the plan consists on establishing a Lebanese political Lobby to support Lebanon and its ties with Syria in international and regional platforms.  Moreover, efforts are being made to control and subjugate the World Lebanese Cultural Union into serving the Regime’s policy lines. This began with the gathering of lists of names prepared by the Lebanese diplomatic and consular missions to be presented to the Diaspora Committee in preparation of an International seminar to elect a new docile and subservient Cultural Union.

3- On the Judicial and Administrative levels

A.     The Judiciary

For the last ten years the Regime has been using the Judiciary as an instrument for opening selected cases and effecting political revenge against opponents. In fact, when the judiciary drops its neutrality in any political struggle it will certainly lose the consensus that upholds its role in the name of the people.

Whilst describing the current situation of the Judiciary would require many pages, we will confine ourselves into detailing the following areas of great concern: 

-         The vast prerogatives given to the military courts contravene the notion of consolidating the State of Law and Institutions. It is important to note that the judicial personnel in the Military courts is an integral part of the Executive Authority used commonly and specifically to assail and subjugate opposition groups under the pretexts of compromising the State Security, Civil Peace and aiding the enemy. 

-         The Judicial Inspection Committee headed by Judge Walid Gamra recognized that the Public Prosecutor has overstepped his prerogatives in the area of interrogations rendering them untenable. A Judicial conflict ensued but was quickly concealed and buried as it usually happens in these cases. 

-         The failure of any judicial reform because all the targeted judges were appointed and enjoy the protection of political and military areas of influence.  The few judges that rebelled and insisted on their independence by implementing their own convictions were removed from important judicial positions. Judge Khaled Hammoud, for example, was dismissed from the financial public prosecutor post because he was considered “unmanageable”.

       -    The frank corruption of some Judges as was authenticated in the case of                seven judges: Mouhib Mimari, Shoukri Sadir, Hussein Zein, Souheil Abd             Samed, Khader Zanhour, Said Mirza and Joseph Kazzi who received, since                1993, exorbitant amounts of money when sitting on the Committees of land                appropriation for the benefit of Solidaire company (Case brought by solicitor                Mohamed Moghrabi against Solidaire).

-         The corruption, the major complications, the high cost of litigation and the selective execution of verdicts are often an important cause for avoiding court actions altogether. These practices influenced a number of foreign investors to withdraw from the Lebanese market.

B.     Administration

The Lebanese public administration is burdened with the management of more than seventy “independent institutions” that belong to the public sector. Many of these institutions are not subject to the government’s Audit Bureau, despite receiving their budgets from the government. Out of those institutions, some are totally useless such as the Railway company, the Zahrani and Tripoli defunct oil refineries, the Bureau of Fruit, the Green Project and last but not the least the Ministry of Information which consecrates Lebanon as one of the least developing nations in need of being subjected to indoctrination and Media Control.

Lebanon is also swamped with administrative routine and bureaucracy.  To advertise the Cultural Baalbek Festival pre-requires 16 different signatures. The Director of Civil Aviation needs 30 signatures to buy one kilogram of coffee. In fact, in the area of administrative reforms, Lebanon is falling at least 30 years behind developed nations and between 15 to 20 years behind some developing nations.

Naturally, any policy of administrative reform or battle against corruption would require a strong and independent judiciary, which is unfortunately badly lacking. Therefore all promises of reforms would always lack implementation.

Presently, the administration’s structure is not much different from what it used to be. The distribution of public service appointments between presidents Herawi, Berri and Hariri in the past has now been replaced with a covert allocation of appointments between Lahoud, Murr and Hoss. This is for example the case with appointments at: The National Social Security Fund, The National News agency, The Casino Du Liban, The Credit Bank, The Electricity company, in addition to The Information Directorate, The Ojero institute, The Ministry of Communications and The Economic and Social Council.

Moreover, following the much-publicized “administrative reforms”, the limited number of dismissed first-class employees were reintroduced into the administration often in higher and more influential positions. A few examples are: Dr Elie Assaf who became an advisor at the Presidential Palace and Mohammad Obeid (Amal movement) the Director of the Ministry of information.

Added to the huge administrative complications and wide-ranging favoritism in public appointments, there is the important issue of the confessional distribution of first-class positions.  According to the figures released by the Council of Public Service, the distribution of the seventy-eight positions are as follows: 16% Maronites, 11% Orthodox, 6% Roman Catholic, 6% to all other Christian denominations, 21% Sunnis, 21% Shiites, 6% Druze and 1% Alawites.  Furthermore, the sixty-three diplomatic first-class positions (ambassadors) are distributed as follows: 18 Maronites, 7 Orthodox, 4 Roman Catholics, 2 for other Christians, 14 Shiites, 12 Sunnis, 5 Druzes and one Alawite.

From within the above context, the idea proposed by President Lahoud on alternating the confessions of the positions in an attempt to achieve secularization has only resulted in significant losses of influential and important Directorates traditionally held by Christians.  Examples include the Directorate of General Security that was given to a Shiite (Jamil Sayyed) and the General Secretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was consolidated to the Sunnis.

Lebanon, burdened with favoritism and inefficiency in the majority of its government departments and agencies, cannot achieve any promising growth so long as its governing bodies are tarnished, corrupt and refuse to pursue modernization.

D-Administrative decentralization

Despite the numerous statements made by a large number of politicians calling for developing and consolidating the system of local government in Lebanon, the adopted policy of the Lebanese government remains poised at preserving central rule and circumvents the idea of expanding the prerogatives and independence of local bodies.

The Lebanese Regime greatly abhors general and true political participation. It sees in municipal elections and local rule a platform encouraging the emergence of new groups and modern ideas, which could endanger the current aging and deficient political system.  This would explain the strict and detailed control exerted by the Interior Minister Michel Murr on all aspects of municipal affairs interfering in their minutiae especially with municipalities that are opposed to the present regime. This occurs whilst the Minister of Interior has recently financed his own political rally at Dabieh- North Matn by imposing a fee of two thousand dollars on each municipality in the Matn province.

4-On the economic level

The actual figures show clearly that net public debt at the end of 1998 has reached $18.3 billions of which 77% are in Lebanese pounds and 23% in foreign currency.  The State’s budget displays a record deficit of 59.3% (making the rate of public debt against national income 113%). Whilst the new budget figures point to a deficit not exceeding 38%, this figure does not include suspended or unscheduled expenses such as social security payments, municipalities accounts and hospitals accounts that require their budgets to be ready and available, rendering the deficit figures proposed inaccurate.  (The Economic Release presented by Dr Marwan Iskander 1999).

According to a study prepared by Dr. Boutros Labaki, Deputy Chairman of the Board of Development and Construction, the economic growth has been declining.  In 1995 growth reached 7 % but today it is less than 1 %. The unemployment rate has reached 10 % and the standard of living in Lebanon continues to deteriorate. A large number of parents are now unable to enroll their children in private schools (seventy thousand students moved to public schools in 98/99 whilst twenty four thousands were distributed into two separate school shifts between morning and afternoon in order to cope with the new numbers).

The rate of illiteracy has started to increase and constitutes now 13% of the total population. The number of child laborers (between the age of ten and fourteen) has also increased. Children are being employed in difficult jobs and paid less than the minimum wage ($ 200 per month). Some work in unacceptable conditions between ten to fourteen hours daily without benefiting from any health or social security.

Meanwhile the foreign workforce is booming.  On a daily basis, around one million Syrian workers are draining an already ailing economy and taking away from the Lebanese the opportunities and the foreign currency. To increase the burden on the economy, the regime has recently provided the Syrian workers with all the benefits of social security.

According to Dr. Mohsen Salim, in his conference at The Holy Spirit University- Kaslik on 29/11/99, we can describe the Syrian workforce in Lebanon as “The Economic Implantation”. These workers often work outside every legal frame.

5- The National Reconciliation

The National Reconciliation Document or “Taef Accord” has been totally devoid of its spirit and selectively applied in accordance with the interests of the Regime.

Based on the order of the document, the following clauses were never implemented (in the past decade):

 

-         The adoption of administrative decentralization.

-         The establishment of the Economic and Social Growth Council.

-         The adoption of compulsory primary education.

-         The establishment of a government of national unity.

-         The reinstatement of the armed forces back into their barracks and the organization of the Security services to serve military purposes only.

-         The redeployment of Syrian Forces.

 

The following clauses were partly and selectively implemented or completely transformed:

 

-         The adoption of the district as a single constituency following a review of the administrative divisions.

-         The establishment of the Constitutional Council

-         The disbanding of the militias

-         The resolution of the issue of the displaced.

-         The increase in the number of deputies to 108 (today they are 128)

-         The organization of the media

It is important to note that despite the numerous requests made by many deputies who participated in the Taef Accord conference (November 1989) to publish the official documents and minutes of the meetings, Syria has asked the former Speaker of Parliament Hussein Husseini to refrain from producing the documents.

Perhaps the ultimate goal that was requested throughout this long road of Calvary was to consolidate the subjugation of Lebanon through “The Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination” with Syria leading to the dissolution of Lebanon’s identity as we discussed earlier.

On May 22, 1991, “The Treaty” was signed and paved the way in principle for the legalization and consolidation of the Lebanese-Syrian relationship but in fact to the premeditated, progressive and legal occupation of Lebanon.

On the first of September 1991 an “Accord of Cooperation and Security” was signed. This accord stipulates the creation of a “Defense and Security Affairs Committee” comprising the ministers of Defense and Interior in both countries.  This committee has “the task of studying the means and methods to help safeguard the Security of both countries and to suggest combined plans to deter any aggression or threat to their national security and to respond to any disturbance that may affect their internal security”.

It is important to note that this accord gave the right for each country to interfere in the internal affairs of the other country in order to respond to any external aggression or internal disturbance. 

The accord also endowed the military and security services with the responsibility to take a number of measures as follows:

 

-         To deter any plan or activity or organization in all the military, security, political and informational fields that may induce any harm or cause any damage to the other country. The Treaty doesn’t differentiate between the Media and the Security and it imposes equal control on both of them. This was done in response to an old Syrian demand concerning the “annoying” Media in Lebanon.

 

-         Both countries would adhere “ not to protect, give asylum or facilitate the traffic of persons and organizations working against the interests and security of the other country.  In the case that they would seek refuge in one country, the latter agrees to arrest and deport them at the request of the other country”. This is indeed what is taking place today when the Lebanese Security Services arrest Lebanese citizens wanted by the Syrians and deliver them promptly without going through the Lebanese Judicial system.

 

-         The Exchange of information on all matters of internal national security including drugs, terrorism and espionage.  Under the provisions of the Treaty, combined Syrian-Lebanese organizations could be established at the ministry of defense in each country (the combined service) and the exchange of officers and personnel encouraged within training exercises.

Subsequently, many more treaties were signed in all economic, social, financial, judicial, agricultural, industrial, trade, health, water, scientific and cultural fields. Treaties were also signed in the areas of organization of peoples and goods movements and in the different aspects of Labor.

Taking all the above into consideration, some Lebanese Regime representatives allege that Syria has recognized Lebanon’s independence from Syria in article one of “The Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination”. This is totally incorrect since they dodge the just of the Syrian terminology or do not realize the difference between “The Lebanese State” and “the Independent State”.

On January 12, 2000, in the presence of a Syrian delegation presided by General Ghazi Kannaan the Chief of the Syrian Intelligence Services in Lebanon, the Mufti of the Lebanese Republic Sheikh Mohammed Rachid Kabbani declared the following: “Lebanon and Syria form one country and one people. The two countries have only been separated after the First World War” (L’Orient Le Jour Newspaper 13/01/2000).

This acquires a particular significance because it is the axiom “one people in two countries” that determines the vision and the true Syrian position towards Lebanon; after all it is the one people who acquire the right to demand the one entity…