THE DEBATE over whether or not to engage Syria is once again center stage this week as a Syrian delegation visits Washington for talks with American officials and academics. Syria's enthusiasm for engaging the next American administration offers the incoming president an opportunity to influence Syrian behavior. The next president would be ill advised to aim this silver bullet on an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty unlikely to be realized. Instead, the United States should aim at getting Syria to end its meddling in neighboring Lebanon and its support for Hezbollah militants.
President Bashar al-Assad is already positioning Syria toward a new administration. American forces have confirmed his cooperation along the Syria-Iraq border, and he is now engaging in indirect negotiations with Israel. He appears to be temporarily moderating his country's negative intervention in Lebanon's internal processes.
Engaging the United States inevitably risks new tension between Damascus and Tehran even without an American precondition of severing relations with Iran. Yet the Syrians seem eager to engage. While such engagement clearly offers mutual gains, it raises the question: What should America ask from Syria in their negotiations?
Many policy analysts argue that the "low-hanging fruit" is an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty. They recommend requiring Syria to actively pursue a peace treaty with Israel in return for full US engagement and resumption of full diplomatic relations. This strategy makes sense: a historic peace between Israel and Syria will significantly reduce the risk of a regional conflict and will destabilize the functions of Palestinian resistance movements headquartered in Damascus.
However, a look at the political dynamics in Israel reveals that such an agreement would not be imminent. The Israeli Parliament is considering a law that will require the government to bring any agreement pertaining to a withdrawal from the Golan Heights to a national referendum.
The issue of relinquishing the Golan Heights encounters three significant barriers. The first is a strong grass-roots lobby on behalf of Israel maintaining the Golan. The second is a lack of urgency in the Israeli public to resolve this dispute due to the absence of an occupied population in this area - significantly different from the approach to the West Bank. The third, and perhaps most important, is that the Israeli public views a withdrawal from the Golan as a significant security risk. Ingredients, no doubt, for nonagreement.
The Israeli prime minister, realizing he cannot pass a treaty in a national referendum, may avoid completing the negotiations - similar to Prime Minister Ehud Barak in 1999. Worse, there could be a treaty that fails to be ratified by the Israeli public. Either way, Syria will be able to circumvent blame, while gaining full relations with the United States.
Taking a broader look at Syrian interests might offer better opportunities for the United States. Syrian leaders have other items of higher priority on their agenda before a peace agreement with Israel. More important for them is regaining their dominance over Lebanon and breaking out of their international isolation through full engagement with the United States.
The United States should approach Assad with a different formula: Syria must choose between its top priorities. If Assad wants to pursue domination over Lebanon and his support for Hezbollah, he should find no friend in Washington. However, if he wants to engage the United States, he would need to end the weapons flow to Hezbollah, demarcate his borders with Lebanon, and establish full diplomatic relations with it - treating it as a fully sovereign state.
Negotiations will not be easy. The Syrians are not eager to "give up" their attempts at domination over Lebanon. But using the leverage of a US-Syrian relationship is the best way to achieve this American interest.
At the same time, the United States should make clear to both Syria and Israel that it will support negotiations and a peace treaty between the two countries. America should even be willing to back an agreement with resources and guarantees, if needed. But it must be made clear that negotiations and a resulting agreement are for Syria and Israel to pursue.
